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Abstract
This paper proposes an event tree to analyze the risk of inadequate flight separation based on the HCR model. We explore how the
consequences of such an event depend on factors such as abilities and mental states of pilots and air traffic controllers, and the efficiency
of human-machine interaction. We also discuss possible practical measures to control risks in an effort to improve civil aviation safety.
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Introduction
With the rapid development of the air transportation industry, air traffic is increasing constantly and airspace is becoming
more congested. One effective countermeasure is reducing flight separation by implementing Reduced Vertical Separation
Minimums (RVSM). While many countries have already begun this process, it creates some challenges for pilots and
controllers. If operational errors are made, inadequate flight separation will occur very quickly.
In fact, incidents of traffic conflict happen frequently, and the risk of inadequate flight separation always exists. If the
potential collision hazard is not detected and appropriate actions are not taken immediately, a mid-air collision could result,
such as the collision between a Boeing 757 and a TU-154 over south Germany on July 1, 2002. In this case, the controller
gave incorrect instructions to the pilots, and inadvertently caused an accident that would have been avoided otherwise
(Brooker, 2008; De Carvalho, Gomes, Huber, & Vidal, 2009).
Therefore, there is a great need to analyze how the abilities of pilots and air traffic controllers (and their human-machine
interfaces) affect the risk analysis results of inadequate flight separation and to effectively assess the safety risk. Based on
this, we can implement regulations and measures to decrease the odds of near-misses and mid-air collisions, as well as
improve the overall safety of aviation.
Currently, most research on inadequate flight separation occurrences focuses on modeling the near miss and calculating
the collision probability. A few works contain an analysis of human factors and human error in these incidents (Xiao-hao,
Dong-bin, & Xiong, 2008; Xiao-hao, Dong-bin, Xiong, & Xiu-hui, 2008; Zhao-ning & Ji-min, 2010). Event Tree Analysis
(ETA) is a system safety analysis method which is highly effective in determining how various events can result in
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accidents. Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) is an
effective way to quantify the numerical relationship
between human and machine interfaces. In this study, the
ETA and HCR method were integrated to analyze and
calculate risks brought by inadequate flight separation. The
event tree of inadequate flight separation is presented and
the process of error rate calculation is also illustrated. The
case study proved the applicability of this method, and
some constructive suggestions are given in conclusion.
Methodology
Safety Risk Analysis
Safety risk analysis (SRA) consists of a variety of
methods, e.g., risk matrix analysis, fuzzy comprehensive
evaluation, fault tree analysis (FTA), and event tree
analysis (ETA) (Global Aviation Information Network,
2003; Johnson, 2003; Kumamoto & Henley, 1996). These
methods can all help the air traffic control system identify
hazards, assess risks, and investigate accidents.
A risk matrix is the most popular analysis method in the
civil aviation industry. It has two factors: risk severity and
risk probability. Each factor has several levels, e.g., high,
medium, and low. This method is most useful when the risk
of an accident is small and the results are mainly subjective.
However, it is not applicable to severe-consequence rare
events, such as aviation accidents.
The fuzzy comprehensive evaluation method is another
widely used method. It applies fuzzy set theory in
mathematics to establish an expert system on a given
problem. Supported by the Flight Safety Foundation,
Hadjimichael and McCarthy (2009) developed the Flight
Operations Risk Assessment System (FORAS). This
assessment is performed using a mathematical model
which synthesizes a variety of inputs, including informa-
tion on crew, weather, aircraft, and so on. The system will
identify those elements that contribute most significantly to
the calculated risk. It can be used to reduce the risks caused
by controlled flight into terrain, loss of control, runway
incursion, etc. It is good for multilevel problems, but is
highly subjective (Place, 2005).
FTA is a method of failure analysis in which an
undesired state of a system is analyzed
using backward logic to combine a series of lower-level
events. This analysis method is mainly used in the field of
safety engineering, especially for complex and large
systems, to quantitatively determine the probability of a
safety hazard. However, the required data is hard to collect
and the computation has a high degree of complexity.
ETA is an inductive procedure that shows all possible
outcomes resulting from an accidental event and takes into
account additional events and factors, such as whether or
not installed safety barriers are functioning. By studying all
relevant accident events, ETA can be used to identify all
potential accident scenarios and sequences in a complex
system. Design and procedural weaknesses can be
identified, and probabilities of various outcomes from an
accidental event can be determined. ETA is generally
applicable for almost any type of risk assessment applica-
tion, but used most effectively to model accidents when
multiple safeguards are in place as protective features. It is
also highly effective in determining how various initiating
events can result in accidents of interest.
Human Reliability Analysis (HRA)
HRA was first used for safety analysis of nuclear plants in
the 1960s. Swain and Guttmann (1983) developed the
technique for human error rate prediction (THERP), based
on an HRA event tree model, which decomposed all crew
behaviors into different developing processes, identified the
path of failure in the event tree, and carried out the appropriate
calculations. Later, Kirwan (1994) showed that the main
purpose of HRA should be to assess risks caused by human
faults and control such human faults. Therefore, he divided
HRA into three processes: fault identification, fault frequency
determination, and design of fault avoidance methods.
The first generation of HRA methods emphasized analyz-
ing, predicting, and reducing human faults by qualitative and
quantitative statistical methods. These methods can be used to
design and improve the safety of a system by decreasing the
probability of major human faults to an acceptable threshold.
HRA is related to the field of human failure theory and human
reliability data analysis (including field and simulator data
analysis), as well as statistical analysis and forecasting
techniques of human failure probability based on experts.
The main HRA models are as follows: ASEP, CM, DNE,
HCR, MAPPS, MFSM, OAT, PC, SLIM, SHARP, and
THERP (Embrey, Humphreys, Rosa, Kirwan, & Rea, 1984;
Hall, Fragola, & Wreathall, 1982; Hannaman, Spurgin, &
Lukic, 1985; Hannaman, Spurgin, Joksimovich, Wreathall, &
Orvis, 1984; Potash, Stewart, Dietz, Lewis, & Dougherty,
1981; Samanta, O’Brien, & Morrison, 1985; Seaver &
Stillwell, 984; Siegel, Bartter, Wolf, & Knee, 1984; Swain
& Guttmann, 1983).
The second generation of HRA methods further explores
human behavior processes. In particular, these methods
examine the mechanisms and probabilities of human errors
in different stages of cognitive activities including observa-
tion, diagnosis, decision and action. Second generation HRA
models focus on the integrity of the interaction between
people and machine, taking into account the impact of psycho-
logical processes and the environment. In addition, the effects
of team spirit are often considered. Such models include many
human-machine-environment concepts taken from systems
engineering. Contemporary popular second-generation HRA
models are as follows: CES, IDA, ATHEANA, and CREAM
(Cooper, et al., 1996; Hollnagel, 1998; Smidts, Shen &
Mosleh, 1997; Woods, Roth, Pople, & Embrey, 1987).
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HRA requires different analysis methods for different
scenarios and industries. To date, these various reliability
models have been applied only rarely to air traffic control.
The Human Cognitive Reliability (HCR) model belongs
to the first generation of HRA models. Hannaman et al.
(1984) proposed a way to quantify the numerical relation-
ship between non-response probability and response time
based on human-machine interfaces, human cognition, and
mean response time (Humphreys, 1995). HCR uses
cognitive psychology to study dynamic cognitive processes
(including inspection, diagnosis, and decision) and to
explore the mechanisms of human error. Compared with
other models of HRA, HCR has its own advantages.
Firstly, the approach explicitly models the time-dependent
nature of HRA (Humphreys, 1995). Secondly, it is a fairly
quick technique to carry out and is relatively easy to use
(Humphreys, 1995). Finally, the three modes of decision-
making—knowledge-based, skill-based, and rule-based—
are all modeled (Humphreys, 1995). These characteristics
are beneficial in the safety analysis of civil aviation. In this
paper, we will use HCR and ETA to study the faults of
pilots and air traffic controllers (ATCs) in an event of
inadequate flight separation.
Analysis of an Inadequate Flight Separation Event
How to Build an Event Tree
An event tree describes the process of people’s behavior
and activities in the form of a two-state event and time-
sequence, based on task analysis. Generally, when analyz-
ing human failure through an event tree, each branch node
only has two probabilities (success or failure). Using the
following scenario as an example, an event tree will be
constructed based on this principle.
In 2008, a B737-800 received a TCAS alert upon reaching
30,000 feet. A voice warning of ‘‘TRAFFIC’’ and a visual
warning of ‘‘TA’’ on the display panel suggested that there
was an approaching aircraft at the same altitude (about 6
nautical miles ahead), and that these two aircraft would
collide in 20 seconds if they maintained their current
directions and speeds. After effective communication and
some collaborative work between the air traffic controller and
the pilots, this hazard was avoided (Aviation Safety Office,
2007). A scenario was designed based on this event; i.e., if
the air traffic controller discovers the conflict, he or she will
correct the error, and if the air traffic controller doesn’t
discover the conflict, TCAS warns, the pilot will take action.
Using this logic, we can construct the event tree in Figure 1.
Analysis Model of Human Error Rate
In this scenario, the pilot and air traffic controller are
working with a specific human-machine interface and are
under time pressure, which fits the parameters of the HCR
model. Therefore, we will adopt HCR to study the possible
errors of the pilot and the ATC. The formula of the HCR






where t represents the available time to choose and execute
Figure 1. Event tree of inadequate flight separation.
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appropriate actions, T0.5 is the average time necessary to
choose and execute appropriate actions, and A, B, and C are
coefficients representing the type of behavior used by the
pilot or controller (see Table 1).
The more abstract and novel the behavior, the higher the
probability of error. Skill based behaviors are the most
routine, consisting simply of stored patterns. Rule based
behaviors are slightly more complex, using ‘‘if-then’’ logic.
Knowledge based behaviors are the most abstract.
This model considers only cases where t/T0.5 > B; when
t/T0.5 , B, the probability of error is considered to be 1.
With regard to the values for the coefficients A, B and C,
due to differences in crew abilities, human-machine
interfaces, and regulations across countries, parameters
obtained from experiments in airplane flight simulators
may differ drastically. Experiment data provided by IAEA
was used in this research, since studies have shown that this
data are generally applicable for ordinary rule-based jobs
(Xuhong, & Xiangrui, 2007).
The pilots’ operations are mostly skill-based, while those
of the air traffic controllers are rule-based. According to
Table 1, A 5 0.407, B 5 0.7, C 5 1.2 will be used for pilots’
operations, while A 5 0.601, B 5 0.6, C 5 0.9 should be
used for air traffic control operations. The time available to
choose and execute appropriate actions, t, can be obtained by
simulated experiments and analysis. T0.5 can be determined
using the following equation (Tiemin et al., 2005):
T0:5 ~ T0:5 1 z k1ð Þ 1 z k2ð Þ 1 z k3ð Þ ð2Þ
where
T0:5 5 Average time necessary to choose and execute
appropriate actions under standard conditions;
k1 5 coefficient for operators’ abilities; (see Table 2;
values from Hongde, & Wei, 2006);
k2 5 coefficient for operators’ nervousness;
k3 5 coefficient for efficiency of human-machine
interaction.
Calculation of Human Error Rate
In the scenario given above (see Figure 1), the cruising
speed of each aircraft is about 500 knots. The two airplanes
are flying in opposite directions, so their relative speed is
about 1000 knots. When this scenario occurs, the distance
between the two airplanes is 6 nautical miles, leaving only
21.6 seconds for the air traffic controller and pilot
recognize the situation and respond appropriately.
Once ATC discovers two airplanes with inadequate
flight separation, immediate action is taken to increase the
separation: the air traffic controller discovers the conflict R
the air traffic controller decides how to adjust the separation
R the air traffic controller informs the pilot and sends
instructions R the pilot answers and reads back the
instructions R the pilot moves the flight controls R the
airplane’s flight path changes.
According to repeated measurements, it takes 2 seconds
for an air traffic controller to identify a conflict and decide
how to adjust its flight path, 1.5 seconds for the air traffic
controller to inform the pilot and send instructions; 1.5
seconds for the pilot to answer and repeat the clearance; 0.4
seconds for the pilot to move the flight controls; and 2
seconds for the airplane to change its flight path (Qinggui,
2005). The average total time for the entire conflict
resolution procedure is 7.4 seconds.
The total available time to choose and execute appro-
priate actions, t, is 21.6 seconds. We then analyze t, T0:5
and the human error rate for the four basic events in this
event tree.
Table 2
Coefficients k1, k2, k3
Condition Value Meanings
k1 Proficient 20.15 Competent at the activity
Average 0.00 Ordinary level of competency
Beginner 0.40 Little operating experience
k2 Urgent 0.60 Emergency; personnel have been threatened
Stressful; accidents may occur
Fairly nervous 0.28 Optimal nervousness; appropriate load
Optimal 0.00 Without any alert sign; low stress
Relaxed 0.20
k3 Excellent 20.22 Own emergent support in an emergency
Good 0.00 Display has comprehensive information
Average 0.51 Display lacks comprehensive information
Inferior 0.78 Operator has an awkward display; not ergonomically correct
Very poor 0.92 The operator cannot see a direct display
Table 1
HCR Model Coefficients
Behavioral Level A B C
Skill-based 0.407 0.7 1.2
Rule-based 0.601 0.6 0.9
Knowledge-based 0.791 0.5 0.8
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Event Tree
In the best case scenario, ATC spots the lack of
separation, informs the pilot, and the pilot corrects the
aircraft’s flight path. This scenario includes two of the four
events.
Event 1: ATC discovers the conflict and informs the pilot
This includes two basic actions: air traffic control
discovers the conflict and decides how to adjust the
separation, then sends instructions to the pilot. T0:5 5 2
seconds + 1.5 seconds 5 3.5 seconds. The corresponding
value of t is 21.6s.
Event 2: Pilot takes timely action, follows ATC commands,
and resolves the conflict
This includes three basic actions: 1) the pilot answers
and repeats air traffic control instructions; 2) the pilot
moves the flight controls; and 3) the airplane changes its
flight path. T0:5 5 1.5 seconds + 0.4 seconds + 2 seconds
5 3.9 seconds; the corresponding value of t should then be
the actual time of Event 1 subtracted from the total
available time (21.6s). However, the actual time of Event 1
is unknown. We therefore assume that the actual time for a
former event can be approximated as a percentage of the
total available time. That percentage can be expressed by
the time to complete the basic actions which the former
event includes divided by the average time necessary to
relieve the conflict (under standard conditions). Then for
Event 2, t 5 21.6 - 21.6*3.5/ (3.5+3.9) 5 11.384s.
Event 3: Pilot takes timely action and resolves the conflict
after a TCAS warning
If air traffic control doesn’t discover the situation or
informs the pilot but the pilot fails to respond, TCAS will
still alert the pilot. If the pilot takes actions and corrects the
situation after a TCAS warning, the progression is: the pilot
hears and judges the TCAS warning R the pilot informs
the air traffic controller (2 seconds) R the air traffic
controller assesses the situation (2 seconds) R the con-
troller responds with instructions (1.5 seconds) R the pilot
answers and repeats instructions (1.5 seconds) R the pilot
moves flight controls (0.4 seconds) R the airplane changes
its flight path (2 seconds). Therefore, the whole procedure
takes 9.4s on average. T0:5 5 9.4 seconds; t 5 21.6s, equal
to the total available time.
Event 4: A pilot sees and avoids the conflict
If both ATC and TCAS fail, a pilot can still avoid a
collision by looking outside and seeing an oncoming
aircraft. In visual meteorological conditions, a pilot can see
another coming aircraft within an efficient distance of no
more than 5 nautical miles. The total time available for a
pilot to choose and execute appropriate actions to avoid a
collision is at most 18 seconds (Potash et al., 1981).
On average, it takes 2.35 seconds (Potash et al., 1981)
for a pilot to shift his or her vision from outside the cockpit
to the display panel inside the cockpit and back outside the
cockpit again (see Table 3; values from Qinggui, 2005).
Generally, it takes about 2 to 5 seconds for a pilot to decide
the best course of action and begin to manipulate the flight
controls. The actual time of completion depends on
individual abilities, with some needing as few as 2 to 3
seconds while others need at least 4 to 5 seconds (Boling,
1999). The current study adopts the average value of 4
seconds. Therefore, the average necessary time for a pilot
to finish Event 4 is T0:5 5 2.35 seconds + 4 seconds 5 6.35
seconds. The total available time is t 5 18 seconds (see
Table 4; values from Qinggui, 2005).
If the time available for the pilot to recognize the
situation and take appropriate actions is less than the
average necessary time for proper operations (6.35
seconds), a mid-air collision will result no matter what
actions are taken.
Suppose that, at the beginning, the air traffic controller
and the pilot are both at the optimal level of nervousness;
i.e., in Events 1 and 2, k2 5 0.00. Considering that the
nervousness of the pilot will increase after he hears a TCAS
warning or sees the oncoming aircraft, k2 5 0.28 in Events
3 and 4. By calculating the human error rate using different
combinations of k1 and k3 (see Tables 5 through 8),
different hypothetical situations can be constructed. For
example, if the operator is a beginner and the human-
machine interaction is extremely poor, t/T0.5 , 0.7 for
Event 3, and the chance of collision is considered to be 1.
Equipment Reliability
The key equipment in this instance is TCAS, so only the
reliability of TCAS will be considered in this paper.
Assuming that the aircraft has two independent TCAS
systems, the probability of TCAS failure in normal
operation is 0.02 (Yunfei, 2011).
Risk Analysis
According to civil aviation statistics in China, there were
61 events of inadequate flight separation from 1998 to
Table 3
Time for Looking from Outside of Cockpit to Instruments and Then
Looking Back
Action Time(s)
Turn head and eyes toward the flight
instruments
0.23
Align sight with instruments 0.07
Focus on an instrument 0.50
Read figures 0.80
Turn head and eyes to outside of the cockpit 0.23
Look at the oncoming aircraft 0.50
Total 2.35
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2007. Total flight time was 21.801 million flight hours
(Yun, Yunxiao, & Xiaochun, 2004), so the odds of
inadequate flight separation are 61/21,801,000 5
2.8061026 per flight hour.
Based on the human error rates calculated using the HCR
model, the probabilities of each branch on the event tree
can be constructed. According to Civil Aviation
Administration of China (CAAC) accident and incident
standard (GB14648-93, MH/T 2001–2008), the conse-
quences of inadequate flight separation are broken into four
categories: lack of adequate flight separation, serious lack
of flight separation (incident), near-miss (serious incident),
and collision (accident). Using different combinations of
coefficients for operators’ abilities, operators’ nervousness,
the efficiency of human-machine interaction, and the four
basic events, more than 100 analytical results from the
event tree can be created. To limit the scope of the article,
the probabilities of consequent events will be discussed:
1) when k1 5 0.00 and the values of coefficients for
efficiency of human-machine interaction are manipulated;
and 2) when k3 5 0.00 and the values of coefficients for
operators’ abilities are manipulated (see Figures 2 and 3).
When human-machine interaction is efficient, the
accident odds are acceptable even when the operators are
beginners. As the skill of the operators grows, the
probability of an accident (or an incident) will decrease;
when the operators are highly skillful, every curve becomes
flat. As the operators’ abilities change from ‘‘beginner’’ to
‘‘average’’, the probability of serious incident decreases
even faster than that of incident (see Figure 2).
The efficiency of the human-machine interaction has an
enormous impact on the risk of inadequate separation
events. Improving it can effectively decrease incident
probability and increase the probability of surviving a
conflict. If the design of the human-machine interfaces
follow principles of human factors, the display equipment
and warning system are efficient, and if both the pilot and
air traffic controller have emergency support available, the
chances of recognizing and correcting for a loss of
separation are very good. For an average operator, when
there is a comprehensive display and good human-machine
interaction, accident probability can decrease from unac-
ceptable to acceptable (see Figure 3).
Risk Control
Three recommendations for the future have been
developed in order to limit the amount of risk involved in
air traffic control. First, airlines should design scenario
training for air traffic controllers and pilots together in
order to prepare them for a real inadequate flight separation
event. In training, special attention should be paid to the
efficiency of communication between air traffic controllers
and pilots so that the urgency of the situation may be
communicated in minimum time with no loss of informa-
tion. Air traffic control should have a normal amount of
traffic to simulate working conditions during the entire
Table 4
Time Parameters for Single Event
No. Event t(s) T0:5
[32] (s)
1 ATC discovers the conflict and informs the pilot 21.6 3.5
2 The pilot takes timely action, follows ATC commands, and resolves conflict 11.4 3.9
3 The pilot takes timely action and resolves conflict after TCAS warning 21.6 9.4
4 The pilot avoids collision visually 18.0 6.4
Table 5
Rate of Human Errors for Event 1
k1k3 20.15 0.00 0.40
20.22 1.5361025 7.6761025 1.1261023
0.00 1.6461024 5.9961024 5.1561023
0.51 4.8361022 7.7061023 3.4361022
0.78 7.7861023 1.6961022 6.1661022
0.92 1.1361022 2.3461022 7.8661022
Table 6
Rate of Human Errors for Event 2
k1k3 20.15 0.00 0.40
20.22 7.1761027 1.4061025 1.3061023
0.00 5.3761025 4.74361024 1.2961022
0.51 6.2761023 2.2861022 0.16
0.78 2.3161022 6.5261022 0.30
0.92 3.8561022 9.8461022 0.39
Table 7
Rate of Human Errors for Event 3
k1k3 20.15 0.00 0.40
20.22 1.1361023 5.6561023 6.4361022
0.00 1.1761022 3.7661022 0.22
0.51 0.15 0.29 0.74
0.78 0.29 0.49 0.97
0.92 0.38 0.60 1
Table 8
Rate of Human Errors for Event 4
k1 k3 20.15 0.00 0.40
20.22 8.0461025 6.5961024 1.6061022
0.00 1.7061023 7.9161023 7.9761022
0.51 4.8361022 0.12 0.44
0.78 0.12 0.24 0.67
0.92 0.17 0.32 0.79
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process, and pilots should follow standard operating
procedures. This will help air traffic controllers and pilots
better understand the priority level between controllers’
instructions and TCAS advisories, preventing further
accidents such as the one mentioned in the introduction.
Secondly, air traffic controllers and pilots need to be able
to respond quickly and with maximum efficiency in the
event of an emergency situation. Their mental status should
be stable. Both controllers and pilots need to avoid negative
moods such as self-satisfaction, complacency, impulsive,
and fear. In particular, controllers need to be quick and alert
to unexpected aircraft movement; pilots need to be ready to
respond, clear-minded, and in full control of the airplane all
the times.
Lastly, the efficiency of the human-machine interaction
is imperative to safety. The design of air traffic control
devices and airplane control systems should be improved,
utilizing the principals of human factors. Such designs
should be optimized to maximize the operators’ physical
and mental comfort, display necessary and sufficient
Figure 2. The influence of operators’ ability.
Figure 3. The influence of human-machine interaction.
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information in a timely manner, reduce the probability of
illusions, and provide effective emergency support.
Conclusions
A safety risk analysis method which applies HCR to
ETA has been developed in this paper and is applied to the
risk analysis of inadequate flight separation.
HCR, a straightforward analytical tool based on an SRA
framework and taking into account the person’s cognitive
processes and the interaction of human-machine interface,
can describe and predict human errors. This study
demonstrates the ease of application of HCR and ETA to
the analysis of the complex human-machine environment.
This method can be difficult to apply, however, if there
is inadequate or incomplete information. In order to
develop it into an effective risk analysis method, future
research should be directed in three areas. Firstly, the event
tree construction rules that take into account human
behavior should be researched. Secondly, T0:5 in HCR is
a key parameter, but its calculation is sometimes difficult.
Accordingly, optimal methods for calculating T0:5 should
be researched and developed. Thirdly, alternatives which
are more appropriate for human behavior analysis and
reliability analysis should be researched when HCR
parameters can’t be obtained or the method is limited by
some conditions.
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